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AMOS	  YONG’S	  PENTECOSTAL	  THOMISM	  	  CRAIG	  A.	  BOYD	  	  In	  responding	  to	  Amos	  Yong’s	  provocative	  and	  engaging	  works	  I	  fear	  that	  the	  Thomistic	  principle	  of	  double-­‐effect	  may	   apply.	   That	   is,	   I	   intend	   to	   juxtapose	   central	   ele-­‐ments	  of	  Yong’s	  work	  on	  divine	  causation	  –	  specifically	  his	   account	   of	   eschatological	   divine	   causation	   and	   his	  notion	  of	  pneumatological	  theology	  –	  with	  certain	  (often	  misunderstood)	   elements	   of	   Thomistic	   metaphysics.	  The	  unintended	  effect	  –or	  at	  least	  the	  secondary	  effect	  –	  of	  this	  will	  be	  to	  irritate	  my	  colleagues	  (especially	  LeRon	  Shults	   and	   Tom	   Oord)	   by	   reintroducing	   that	   most	   un-­‐welcome	  of	  philosophical	  guests,	  Aristotle.	  	   What	  I	  contend	  is	  that	  there	  are	  at	  least	  two	  ele-­‐ments	  of	  “consonance”	  between	  Yong’s	  account	  of	  divine	  causation	  and	  Aquinas’s	  that	  warrant	  serious	  considera-­‐tion.	  In	  fact,	  Yong	  explicitly	  appeals	  to	  Aristotle	  when	  he	  contends	  that	  we	  should	  reintroduce	  teleology	  into	  our	  causal	   explanations	   (“How	   Does	   God	   Do	   What	   God	  Does?”62).	  Those	  elements	  are	   (1)	   the	  primacy	  of	   tele-­‐ology	   and	   (2)	   a	   “participatory”	   understanding	   of	   crea-­‐turely	   action	   within	   the	   divine	   order.	   There	   are,	   of	  course,	  significant	  differences.	  For	  example,	  Yong	  advo-­‐cates	   for	  a	   libertarian	  account	  of	  human	  freedom	  while	  Aquinas	  accepts	  a	  kind	  of	  “compatiblism.”	  Here,	  I	  whole-­‐heartedly	   side	   with	   Yong.	   Yong	   also	   notes	   that	   on	   the	  Thomistic	   account	   of	   primary	   and	   secondary	   causality	  that	   the	   problem	   of	   evil	   remains.	   I	   agree	   that	   Aquinas	  never	   sufficiently	   provides	   an	   answer	   here	   but	   then	  again	  I	  remain	  skeptical	  about	  any	  account	  to	  solve	  this.	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  However,	   the	  most	   important	   point	   of	   divergence	   con-­‐cerns	   the	   nomological	   behavior	   of	   “substances.”	   For	  Aquinas,	  laws	  of	  nature	  do	  not	  vary	  unless	  God	  changes	  the	  formal	  nature	  of	  the	  cosmos.	  But	  for	  Yong’s	  Peircean	  ontology,	  laws	  of	  nature	  are	  rather	  “habitual	  tendencies	  that	   function	   teleologically	   like	   final	   causes”	   (Spirit	   of	  
Creation,	  138).	  This	  last	  point	  plays	  a	  critical	  role	  in	  the	  reconsideration	  of	  a	  Thomistic	  ontology	  that	  subscribes	  to	  fixed	  essences.	  	   As	   I	   read	   Yong’s	  work,	   I	   see	   the	   desire	   to	   steer	  the	  middle	   course	  between	   classical	   accounts	  of	   divine	  action	   in	   the	   world	   as	   too	   mechanistic	   and	   “interven-­‐tionist,”	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  modernist	  accounts	  where	  Special	  Divine	  Action	  is	  sacrificed	  to	  an	  account	  of	  Gen-­‐eral	  Divine	  Action	  which	  simply	  is	  not	  robust	  enough	  to	  account	   for	   traditional	   Pentecostal	   (and	   Yong	   would	  claim,	   “biblical”)	  accounts	  of	  how	  the	  Spirit	  of	  God	  acts	  in	  the	  world,	  on	  the	  other	  hand.	  He	  is	  initially	  suspicious	  of	  Thomistic	  accounts	  of	  divine	  causation	  for	  a	  number	  of	   reasons,	   but	   he	   may	   have	   interpreted	   Aquinas	   in	   a	  way	   that	  does	  not	   lend	   itself	   to	  a	  more	  productive	  dia-­‐logue	  than	  it	  could.	  In	   his	   discussion	   of	   Aquinas	   Yong	   claims	   that	  “Most	  pertinent	  for	  our	  purposes,	  is	  Thomas’s	  argument	  from	  motion:	   (a)	   there	   is	   no	   movement	   that	   is	   purely	  self-­‐caused;	   (b)	   an	   infinite	   regress	   of	   movers	   is	   self-­‐contradictory;	   thus	   (c)	   there	  must	   be	   a	   first	   Unmoved	  Mover”	   (“How	  Does	  God	  Do	  What	  God	  Does?”	  52).	  Alt-­‐hough	  the	  arguments	  from	  motion	  and	  efficient	  causali-­‐ty	  get	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  attention	  following	  Aquinas’s	  time,	  I	  believe	  that	  the	  most	  important	  of	  the	  arguments	  is	  the	  argument	  from	  final	  causality	  (often	  misnamed	  “the	  ar-­‐gument	  from	  design”).	  But	  why	  is	  that?	  For	  Aquinas,	  as	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  for	  Aristotle,	  the	  most	  important	  of	  the	  four	  causes	  was	  the	  final	  cause	  since	  a	  being	  took	  its	  formal	  nature	  from	  its	  end,	  or	  goal.	  Since	  the	  “Five	  Ways”	  flow	  from	  Aristo-­‐tle’s	   four	   causes,	   we	   can	   see	   that	   the	   Fifth	  Way	   likely	  represents	   the	   most	   important	   of	   the	   “Ways”	   since	   it	  represents	   the	   most	   important	   of	   the	   causal	   explana-­‐tions.	  In	  fact,	  the	  entire	  structure	  of	  the	  Summa	  Theolo-­‐
giae	   is	   patterned	   after	   the	   exitus-­‐redditus	   scheme	   in	  which	   teleology	   plays	   the	   central	  metaphysical	   role	   as	  creatures	   “return”	   to	  God	   from	  whence	   they	   came.	  But	  divine	   causality	   is	   represented	   not	   only	   in	   terms	   of	   a	  temporal	  teleology	  but	  also	  with	  respect	  to	  a	  causal	  de-­‐pendency	  of	  the	  creature	  upon	  God.	  Aquinas	  sees	  a	  hierarchy	  of	  agents	  at	  work	  in	  the	  created	   order.	   There	   are	   clearly	   lower	   and	   higher	  agents.	  Any	   lower	   agent	   obtains	   its	   power	   through	   the	  efficacy	  of	  the	  higher	  agent	  as	  “the	  artisan	  applies	  an	  in-­‐strument	  to	  its	  proper	  effect,	  though	  he	  neither	  gives	  the	  Form	  whereby	   the	   instrument	  works,	   nor	   preserves	   it,	  but	   simply	   gives	   it	   motion”	   (Thomas	   Aquinas,	   Summa	  
Contra	  Gentiles,	  III,	  70).	  	   The	   underlying	   rationale	   for	   this	   analogy	   is	  Aquinas’s	  participation	  metaphysics.	  All	  creation	  partic-­‐ipates	  in	  God	  because	  there	  can	  be	  no	  being	  apart	  from	  God.	  He	  says,	  	  	   Creatures	  are	  said	  to	  be	  in	  God.	  .	  .	  in	  one	  sense	  in-­‐sofar	  as	  they	  are	  contained	  and	  preserved	  by	  the	  divine	  power;	  even	  as	  we	  say	  that	  things	  that	  are	  in	   our	   power	   are	   in	   us.	   And	   thus	   creatures	   are	  said	   to	   be	   in	  God,	   even	   according	   to	   their	   exist-­‐ence	  in	  their	  own	  natures.	  In	  this	  sense	  we	  must	  understand	   the	   words	   of	   the	   Apostle	   when	   he	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  says,	  In	  Him,	  we	   live,	  and	  move,	  and	  have	  our	  be-­‐
ing;	  since	  our	  living,	  being,	  and	  moving	  are	  them-­‐selves	   caused	   by	   God	   (Thomas	   Aquinas,	   ST,	  Ia.18,4,ad1).	  	  God	  provides	  the	  ontological	  grounding	  for	  all	  creature-­‐ly	  activity	  because	  all	  creatures	  derive	  their	  being	  from	  God	   not	   merely	   as	   a	   child	   derives	   her	   being	   from	   her	  mother	  and	  father	  but	  in	  the	  more	  profound	  sense	  that	  they	   continually	   rely	   upon	   God	   as	   the	   higher	   cause	   of	  their	   activities.	   Not	   only	   has	   God	   granted	   being	   to	   all	  creatures	   when	   they	   first	   receive	   their	   existence,	   God	  also	   conserves	   their	   being	   as	   long	   as	   they	   continue	   to	  exist	  since	  a	  creature’s	  being	  is	  radically	  contingent	  up-­‐on	  God.	  As	   long	   as	   a	   creature	  has	  being	   it	   also	  has	   the	  causal	   powers	   God	   has	   granted	   it.	   Thus,	   “If	   this	   divine	  influence	   were	   to	   cease,	   every	   operation	   would	   cease.	  Therefore,	   every	   operation	   of	   a	   thing	   is	   traced	   back	   to	  Him	  as	  to	  its	  cause”	  (Aquinas,	  Summa	  Contra	  Gentiles,	  III,	  67).	  	   It	   is	   in	   light	   of	   the	   participation	  metaphysics	   of	  Aquinas	  where	  we	   see	  another	  avenue	  of	   convergence.	  Because	  many	  contemporary	  interpreters	  portray	  Aqui-­‐nas	   as	   drawing	   a	   radical	   separation	   between	   Creator	  and	  creation,	  the	  transcendence	  of	  God	  is	  emphasized	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  divine	  immanence.	  As	  a	  result,	  we	  see	  lit-­‐tle	   emphasis	  on	   the	  participation	  ontology	   that	  perme-­‐ates	  Aquinas’s	  thought.	  What	  we	  see	  is	  a	  radical	  contin-­‐gency	  of	  the	  creation	  on	  the	  Creator.	  It	  is	  here	  that	  God	  is	   no	   longer	   merely	   one	   agent	   among	   others	   acting	   in	  the	  created	  order,	  but	   the	  Spirit	  of	  God	   that	  permeates	  the	  created	  order.	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  Contemporary	  Thomists,	   like	  W.	  Norris	  Clarke,	  seem	  to	  articulate	  accounts	  of	  this	  kind.	  Clarke	  writes,	  	   God	  is	  constantly	  working	  creatively	  with	  the	  on-­‐going	  unfolding	  of	  the	  world’s	  own	  built-­‐in	  active	  potentialities,	  stepping	  up	  his	  creative	  collabora-­‐tion	   at	   certain	   key	   thresholds	   to	   inject	   new	   in-­‐formation-­‐sets—not	   necessarily	   new	   physical	  energy—into	   the	  process	   to	  enable	  new	  qualita-­‐tively	  higher	  ontological	  centers	  with	  new	  prop-­‐erties	   to	   appear	   on	   the	   scene.	   Such.	   .	   .	   creative	  collaboration	  of	  God,	  acting	  on	  a	  totally	  spiritual	  level,	  would	   entirely	   escape	   all	   empirical	   obser-­‐vation,	   quantitative	   measurement,	   or	   scientific	  detection	   in	   any	  way	   (The	   One	   and	   the	  Many:	   A	  
Contemporary	   Thomistic	   Metaphysics	   [Notre	  Dame:	   University	   of	   Notre	   Dame	   Press,	   2001],	  256).	  	  	  Here,	   the	   created	   order—in	   traditional	   Thomistic	   un-­‐derstanding—is	   full	   of	   potencies	   waiting	   to	   be	   actual-­‐ized	  by	  various	  causes—both	  God	  and	  creatures.	  On	  this	  view,	  the	  creation	  continues	  to	  develop	  not	  in	  the	  man-­‐ner	   of	   predetermined	   Augustinian	   rationes	   seminales	  but	  with	  respect	  to	  genuinely	  new	  creatures—a	  decided	  departure	   from	  Aquinas’s	   own	   Aristotelian	   view	   of	   es-­‐sential	  natures.	  	   This	  neo-­‐Thomist	  account	  offered	  by	  Clark	  bears	  an	   interesting	   similarity	   to	   Yong’s	   Pentecostal	   account	  of	  divine	  agency.	  Peirce,	  Clark,	  and	  Yong	  all	  have	  the	  ad-­‐vantage	   of	   working	   in	   a	   post-­‐Darwinian	   age—an	   ad-­‐vantage	  Aquinas	  could	  not	  have	  anticipated.	  However,	  if	  the	   “Angelic	  Doctor”	   could	  have	  known	  what	  we	  know	  
Craig	  A.	  Boyd	   107	  today	  about	  so-­‐called	  “laws	  of	  nature”	  he	  may	  softened	  his	  radical	  essentialism	  and	  opted	  for	  a	  metaphysic	  that	  looked,	   in	   many	   ways,	   similar	   to	   that	   of	   Amos	   Yong’s	  Pentecostal	  account	  of	  divine	  causation.	  
